He writes that the mad patients, once captured on film, become manifest in photography was instrumentalized as a truth machine and a time machine. According to art historian Georges Didi-Huberman, it was behind the *Photographia*: one writes the light of reality, burning it into film. With 2003 (11-12 a.m.), print 2005, pigment ink print. Gift of Maggie Hunt, Class of 1978; 2005.10.

The weakness of human sight—its flickering hesitation and intermittent duration, although seeing has a terrible duration, a single moment of emergence only as a theft, and as anticipated; this is to say that it also denies the time that engenders it, denies memory and threat, inventing itself as an instantaneity and efficiency as a victory over time . . . . It invents itself as an instantaneity and efficiency, which in the always intersubjective moment of sight, emerges only as a theft, and as anticipated; this is to say that it also denies the time that engenders it, denies memory and threat, inventing itself as an instantaneity and efficiency as a victory over time . . . . 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It invents itself as an instantaneity and efficiency, which in the always intersubjective moment of sight, emerges only as a theft, and as anticipated; this is to say that it also denies the time that engenders it, denies memory and threat, inventing itself as an instantaneity and efficiency as a victory over time . . . . It invents itself as an instantaneity and efficiency, which in the always intersubjective moment of sight, emerges only as a theft, and as anticipated; this is to say that it also denies the time that engenders it, denies memory and threat, inventing itself as an instantaneity and efficiency as a victory over time . . . . It invents itself as an instantaneity and efficiency, which in the always intersubjective moment of sight, emerges only as a theft, and as anticipated; this is to say that it also denies the time that engenders it, denies memory and threat, inventing itself as an instantaneity and efficiency as a victory over time . . . . It invents itself as an instantaneity and efficiency, which in the always intersubjective moment of sight, emerges only as a theft, and as anticipated; this is to say that it also denies the time that engenders it, denies memory and threat, inventing itself as an instantaneity and efficiency as a victory over time. The flatness of the wall and photographic surface is made to signify an implicit temporal depth. Only by waiting “in light” of some three decades was Morell finally able to return to Cuba to “contemplate new realities under the half-light of things remembered.” And only with time and distance—time spent in exile, and distance from home—was Morell able to crystallize this broken image of the past.

Where the photographic apparatus allows Morell to explore the time of remembrance and reconstruction, it reveals a time of forgetting for Matthew Pillsbury in *George Sogor, Seducing the Babysitter, Tuesday, April 1, 2003, 11-12 am* (2003). Unlike photographs that isolate a frame of the televised moving image to lend impact to the frozen moment, Spencer instead shows the incessant flow of visual information through the light on the television screen, which, over an hour, dissolves into a homogenous white light. Information itself becomes the dominating presence in the photograph, while the man’s presence is seen only in a blur. Such is the condition of today’s media age. Spectatorial viewing allows one to not be fully “in time” but instead lapse into a sleepiness that dissolves the background flicker of the television into light. Pillsbury’s photograph visualizes this mediated temporality of man and machine, where time flows on homogeneously without intensities of attention or affective experience.

The tension between photographic stasis, temporality, and lived experience explored in the context of the contemporary by Morell and Pillsbury is taken to a more fundamental level in Hiroshi Sugimoto’s photographs. Sugimoto has said that the image of the sea is “an early example of a human naming something outside the world inside himself” (*Brougher*). His photographs return the viewer to the origin of a scopic desire to compress the infinite expanse and flow of water into discrete images—cropped and framed—that allow their naming and recognition. In this process, the abstract sea becomes fixed to a certain time and place, and the photograph is made into a representation of a name. But at the same time, taken as a series, Sugimoto’s photographs thwart this movement toward localization: time flows among them and allows them to be read cinematically, as the story of a timeless sea that has been liberated from the photographic moment.

Together, these photographs stage the fragmentation of the “moment” into multiple temporalities. They can help remind us that a photograph need not represent truth about a certain time or place but can reveal to us experiential truths about the nature of time itself.

Chanon (Kenji) Prapipatmongkol ’13, Mellon Special Project Curatorial Intern

Matthew Pillsbury, George Spencer, Solitary Sale: Bipartite, Tuesday, April 2, 2003, 11-12 am, gelatin silver print, 2003.11.2. 

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_Hiroshi Sugimoto, Memento Sol, 1991, gelatin silver print. Purchased through a gift from the Sondra and Charles Gilman Jr. Foundation; the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation._

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